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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
ORDINANCES
Shortly after the turn of the century when mass migration from
rural to urban centers began, many of the large cities, especially those
in the South, found it desirable to pass special ordinances segregating
the races. The aim of these ordinances was to check the further
infiltration of Negro elements of the population into the then existing
white sections. The purpose of this comment is to trace the course
and development of these residential segregation ordinances in the
seventeen southern states in which segregation in education is decreed
by state law.'
The state and federal courts will normally hold that if a statute
or ordinance involves a reasonable exercise of the police power, it
does not constitute a deprivation of property without due process of
law merely because it limits or restricts the use which the owner may
make of his property. This type of reasoning is employed in sustain-
ing the constitutional validity of the customary residential and com-
mercial type zoning ordinances for the public health, safety and wel-
fare. Accordingly, the framers of residential segregation ordinances
have contended that, since their purpose is to promote the public
peace and safety by preventing race conflicts, they are not an uncon-
stitutional exercise of the inherent governmental power of the state.
Apparently one of the first cities to enact a residential segregation
ordinance was Baltimore, Maryland, in 1911. Within a few years
many other cities had followed suit. The Baltimore ordinance pro-
hibited white persons from residing in a block in which the buildings
therein were occupied exclusively by Negroes, and likewise restricted
Negroes from moving into a building in any block occupied exclusively
by white persons. This ordinance was the first to be attacked by the
courts. In State of Maryland v. Curry2 it was contended that the
ordinance was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States. The Maryland Court of Appeals held
that there was no unconstitutional discrimination between races in
an ordinance which prohibited white and colored persons from mov-
ing into blocks occupied exclusively by members of the other race,
IALA. CONST., Art. XIV, sec. 256; Aim. STAT., 80-509(c); DEL. CoNsT.,
Art. X, see. 2; FLA. CONST., Art. XII, see. 12; GA. CONST., Art. VIII, see. 1; Ky.
CONST., See. 187; LA. CONST., Art. XII, sec. 1; Miss. CONST., Art. VIII, sec. 207;
MO. CONST., Art. IX, see. 1(a); N. C. CoNsT., Art. IX, sec. 2; OKLA. CoNST., Art.
XIII, sec. 8; S. C. CONST., Art. XI, sec. 7; TENN. CONST., Art. XI, sec. 12; Tx.
CONST., Art. VII, sec. 7; VA. CONST., Art. IX, sec. 140; W. VA. CONST., Art. XII,
sec. 8; D. C. CODE, see. 13.
2 121 Md. 534, 88 A. 546 (1913).
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since -what was denied one race was denied the other. However, the
ordinance was declared void on the ground that it unreasonably in-
terfered with vested rights in property, because the owner of a house
whose rights therein accrued prior to passage of the ordinance was
prohibited by it from occupying his own house. The court indicated
that it would have sustained a segregation ordinance properly framed
to allow those who owned residences at the time the ordinance be-
came effective to move into and occupy them.
About this time a lower court decision in Virginia 3 held that a
segregation ordinance more drastic in its practical effect than the one
in Baltimore was constitutional. This ordinance prohibited the estab-
lishment, in the future, of residences by either race in any block
except wherein the race was in a majority.4 In its opinion the court
said that it would take judicial notice that the close association of
persons of the white and colored races results, or tends to result, in
breaches of the peace, immorality, and danger to health, in view of
state legislation providing for separate coaches on railroads and
separate schools. In upholding the validity of the ordinance the court
argued that since the ordinance applied to both white and colored
it was not discriminatory, and further, that if the statutes providing
for segregation in schools and transportation were constitutional then
segregation-zoning ordinances must on the same basis be constitu-
tional also.
The same question as that decided by the Virginia court above
was presented to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Hopkins
v. City of Richmond.5 The ordinance involved was the customary
type except that it, like the Baltimore ordinance, would also prohibit
an owner of a house at the time the ordinance was enacted from
occupying it if it was in a block occupied by members of the other
race. The court held this ordinance constitutional in so far as it
applied to persons whose rights as owners or tenants had accrued
subsequent to passage of the ordinance, and unconstitutional only as
it restricted the right of any white or colored person to move into
and occupy property of which he was the owner on the effective
date of the ordinance.
'Ashland v. Coleman, 19 Va. Law Reg. 427 (1918).
'This type of segregation ordinance is considered more drastic since it would
prevent further movement into those blocks in which the negroes had gained a
foothold but were not yet in the majority. The other type ordinance merely pro-
hibited negroes from moving into blocks exclusively occupied by white persons.
Thus, if in a particular block at the time of passage of the ordinance, only one
negro resided therein, the ordinance would not prevent other negroes from mov-
ing in also.
117 Va. 692, 86 S.E. 189 (1915).
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In Georgia a segregation ordinance passed by the city of Atlanta
was contested in Carey v. City of Atlanta6 in 1915. The Georgia
Supreme Court held that that ordinance, which prohibited white and
colored persons from residing in the same block and made no excep-
tion in the case of those with vested property rights at the time of
passage of the ordinance, denied the inherent right of a person to
acquire, enjoy and dispose of property, and for that reason was
violative of the due process clause of the state and Federal constitu-
tions. The city of Atlanta then passed an ordinance identical with
the one enacted by Louisville, Kentucky, which had just been held
constitutional by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The Georgia
Supreme Court aligned itself with the Kentucky court.7 Both held
that these ordinances were a valid exercise of the police power of
the state in attempting to promote the public welfare and to preserve
friendly relations between the races.
On the basis of the foregoing cases it would appear that the con-
trolling factor was not a consideration of the drastic effect of any
ordinance in the sense that it referred to blocks exclusively occupied
or only partially occupied by one race, but rather was conditioned
by the effect of the ordinance on existing property rights at the time
the ordinance was enacted. Thus, those ordinances which were in-
tended to apply only to property subsequently acquired were held
valid, while those failing to make that distinction were held unconsti-
tutional.
The only case holding a prospective residential segregation ordi-
nance unconstitutional was State v. Darnell,8 a North Carolina case,
but that case was based upon an interpretation of the city charter.
The ordinance was substantially the same as that involved in Hardin
v. City of Atlanta.9 The court held that Winston Salem was without
authority to adopt the ordinance since it had not been expressly
granted the power to pass such an ordinance, nor could that power
be inferred in view of the general policy of the state, "there being no
similar state laws, the legislature having enacted statutes tending to
keep the Negroes from emigrating." This ordinance, the court said,
attempted to forbid the owner of property to sell or lease to whom-
ever he saw fit, but the "right of disposing of property, the jus dis-
ponendi, has always been held one of the inalienable rights incident
to the ownership of property which no statute will be construed as
'143 Ga. 192, 84 S.E. 456 (1915).
'Harden v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248, 93 S.E. 401 (1917).8166 N. C. 300, 81 S.E. 338 (1914).
'Supra, note 7.
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having power to take away." The North Carolina court declined
to decide whether a state statute directly authorizing town com-
missioners to make such an ordinance would be constitutional. It did,
however, imply that had the legislature intended to establish such a
policy as to Negroes it would certainly have made provision for se-
lecting districts and would not have conferred such unlimited powers
on the commissioners.
Although other southern cities by this time had enacted similar
segregation ordinances, there do not appear to be any more decisions
by courts of record in those states prior to 1917 other than the ones
reviewed.
The Supreme Court of the United States was faced with the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of a residential segregation ordinance for
the first time in the case of Buchanan v. Warley.10 The case involved
the segregation ordinance adopted by Louisville, Kentucky. The or-
dinance was entitled:
"An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill feeling between
the white and colored races in the city of Louisville, and to preserve
the public peace and promote the general welfare by making reason-
able provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the use of separate
blocks for residences, places of abode and places of assembly by
white and colored people respectively."'
The ordinance declared it unlawful for any colored person to
move into and occupy in the future any house on any block upon
which a greater number of houses were accupied by white people
than by colored people. Likewise, white people were forbidden from
moving into any block where there were more colored persons' resi-
dences than white. The plaintiff Buchanan was a white man who
sued defendant Negro to secure specific performance of a contract
to purchase real estate owned by plaintiff. The defendant contended
that since he was a colored person it would be unlawful for him to
occupy the property he had contracted to purchase. The plaintiff
contended the ordinance was unconstitutional in that it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by abridg-
ing the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States to
acquire and enjoy property, taking property without due process of
law and denying equal protection of the laws. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals, in the companion cases of Harris v. City of Louisville and
Buchanan v. Warley,12 had sustained the constitutionality of the Louis-
ville ordinance, holding that it was neither a deprivation of property
-°245 U.S. 60 (1917).
Id. at 70.22165 Ky. 559, 177 S.W. 472 (1915).
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without due process of law nor a violation of the right of alienation
since the ordinance did not deprive any person of the right to ac-
quire property anywhere in the city-the only restraint being on
occupancy. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
the plaintiff contended that although the ordinance did not expressly
prohibit a white person from selling to a colored person, and vice
versa, the practical effect of the ordinance was to deny such right
of alienation. This is true, plaintiffs counsel contended, for if 'he
cannot sell to a colored person, he cannot sell at all, for the lot is so
situated with reference to other colored men's residences that no
white man would buy it."'13 The Supreme Court of the United States,
in reversing the decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, stated
that although the police power of the states was very extensive it
could not validly be employed to pass a residential segregation ordi-
nance discriminating on the basis of color. The decision was based
entirely on due process and did not involve plaintiff's other conten-
tions in regard to privileges and immunities and equal protection of
the laws. The court distinguished the point involved herein from
its earlier decisions upholding segregation statutes as to trains and
schools, by asserting that in the latter cases a person was not denied
the right to acquire, use, control and dispose of his property as in the
Buchanan case. In those cases, of course, the railroad owners were
deprived of the right to control their property, but they had never
complained of that deprivation. The complainant passenger could
show at best a mere regulation of a privilege.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Buchanan case had the practical effect of overruling all the State court
decisions upholding such ordinances. Subsequent to that decision,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered an ordinance which
differed from the Louisville ordinance in that the former related to
blocks where all the occupants were of one race and prohibited one
not of that race from occupying a residence of that block, while the
latter related to blocks in which the white or colored inhabitants were
in the majority, and thus involved one of the less-drastic types of
segregation ordinances. The court, however, on the authority of the
Buchanan case held the Baltimore ordinance unconstitutional. 4 The
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia15 and the Georgia Supreme
Court'16 both relying on the Buchanan case held segregation ordinances
substantially the same as Louisville's unconstitutional.
"Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 62 (1917).
" Jackson v. State of Maryland, 132 Md. 311, 103 A. 910 (1918).
" Irvine v. City of Clifton Forge, 124 Va. 781, 97 S.E. 310 (1918).
'CGlover v. City of Atlanta, 148 Ga. 285, 96 S.E. 562 (1918).
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In searching for means of avoiding the Supreme Court's decision
in the Buchanan case the city of New Orleans seized upon the dis-
tinction drawn by the Court between segregdtion zoning ordinances
and segregation statutes relating to transportation and education and
conceived the idea that if there were no direct state interference with
a person's right freely to dispose of his property a segregation ordi-
nance might be constitutional. Accordingly, the city adopted an
ordinance making it unlawful for a white or colored person to occupy
a residence in a community or portion of the city occupied by those
of the other race without written consent of a majority of the residents
of that community or section. The Louisiana court of last resort
held the ordinance constitutional1' on the theory that it was not
actually a racial discrimination in civil or political rights, but merely
a social distinction, and came within the exercise of the police power.
In distinguishing the Buchanan case the court said that there the
Supreme Court of the United States had found in fact that white
persons were restrained by the ordinance from selling to colored
persons, and vice versa, which was an interference with the freedom
of contract; here there was nothing in the ordinance forbidding the
sale by one to the other. The ordinance did not forbid a Negro
owner of property in a Negro block from selling to a white person
who intended to move into the house, and vice versa, but merely said
that that person must get the written consent of a majority of residents
of that block before carrying out his intent. It is difficult to see how
the court arrived at this distinction inasmuch as the Louisville or-
dinance did not place any restriction on sale either. Nevertheless, in
the Buchanan case the Supreme Court found that in its practical
application the ordinance did have that effect. It would appear that
the New Orleans ordinance would clearly have the same effect. On
appeal of this case to the United States Supreme Court,'8 in a memor-
andum decision, the holding of the Louisiana Court was reversed on
the authority of the Buchanan case.
The only written opinion by a federal court involving the distinc-
tion made by the Louisiana court in regard to restriction of occu-
pancy, as distinguished from sale of real property, seems to have been
that in City of Birmingham v. Monk,19 decided by the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In that case the court
refused to make any distinction between the two ordinances and held
this one unconstitutional also.
Tyler v. Harmon, 158 La. 489, 104 So. 200 (1925).
"Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927).
'9185 F. 2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950).
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After that decision the city of Richmond, Virginia, attempted
another new approach. It passed an ordinance prohibiting any person
from using as a residence any building on any street between inter-
secting streets where a majority of the residences on such street were
occupied by those with whom the person by law was forbidden to
intermarry. In arguing the case wherein the validity of this ordinance
was attacked, 20 appellant-city attempted to distinguish the situation
here from those in the Buchanan and Harmon cases by showing that
this ordinance was based on the legal prohibition of intermarriage
and not on race or color, but the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia decided that in the final analysis the ordinance was based on
race since the legal prohibition of intermarriage was itself based on
race.
In Oklahoma two more cases involving variations on this same
theme arose. The first, in 1935, was an action for injunctive relief to
prevent enforcement of the "Segregation Ordinance" of Oklahoma
City.2 '. This ordinance prohibiting occupation was justified by defen-
dant-city by showing that it was enacted after the Governor of Okla-
homa issued an Executive Military Order declaring a state of martial
law to exist in certain areas of the city of Oklahoma City, and direct-
ing that city to enact this ordinance. The Oklahoma Supreme Court,
however, held the Governor's Order void and legally unenforceable
and, therefore, the ordinance based upon it failed also.
The next Oklahoma case in point arose ten years later. In Grist v.
Henshaw22 plaintiffs attempted to enjoin defendants from selling lots
in a nearby subdivision to Negroes on grounds that it would create
a public nuisance and destroy the value of their property. Despite
the fact that the case at bar did not involve a zoning ordinance the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma relied on the Buchanan case and held
that although the action was primarily between individuals the court
could not restrict the sales; to do so would be a clear violation by the
court of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The city of Winston Salem, North Carolina, created a very exten-
sive zoning ordinance which contained one provision excluding
Negroes from occupying houses in certain zones into which the city
was divided, and was not, as in the Buchanan case an attempt at
segregation directly by an ordinance not purporting to be a zoning
ordinance. This raised the question of whether such a provision in
a broad and otherwise valid zoning ordinance would be approved
City of Richmond v. Deans, 37 F. 2d 712 (4th Cir. 1930).
Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421, 52 P. 2d 1054 (1935).
=196 Okla. 168, 163 P. 2d 214 (1945).
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by the courts. In Clinard v. City of Winston Salem23 the North Caro-
lina court answered the question in the negative. There appears to
have been only one other case2 4 involving the inclusion in a general
zoning plan of one provision for segregation. The court there also
held the ordinance unconstitutional. While this question has never
been directly decided by the Supreme Court of the United States it
would appear, in view of the widespread application of the holding
in the Buchanan case, that the court would merely declare the segrega-
tion provision unconstitutional while leaving the remainder of the
ordinance substantially intact. It is submitted that this would be a
fundamentally sound result.
The author was unable to discover cases in the remainder of the
seventeen southern states having segregation by law, and it is, there-
fore, assumed that if the question has arisen in those states it has
never been adjudicated by a court of last resort.
In view of the foregoing discussion it is now manifest that all ordi-
nances contemplating segregation of the races as to places of abode
are unconstitutional. Such legislation exceeds the proper exercise
of the police power and in its purpose is clearly violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Any theory of promotion of the public peace and welfare by pre-
vention of racial conflicts is overridden by the serious infringement
of property interests. The courts contend that regardless of what
may be argued in support of segregation legislation in other contexts
and its application in particular to education, it will not apply to
legislation of this variety wherein persons are clearly deprived, with-
out due process of law, of their constitutionally guaranteed privilege
of disposing of property.
JAmES S. KOSTAS
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND MOTION PICTURES-
THE "MIRACLE" DECISION
In Burstyn v. Wilson,' the Supreme Court of the United States for
the first time was presented squarely with the question: Are motion
pictures within the ambit of protection which the First Amendment,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, secures to any form of speech
or the press? The question was answered in the affirmative and a
-3217 N. C. 119, 6 S.E. 2d 867 (1940).
' Bowen v. City of Atlanta, 159 Ga. 145, 125 S.E. 199 (1924).172 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952).
